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Abstract—Achieving accurate, cost-efficient, and fast anomaly
localization is a highly desired feature in computer networks.
Prior works, examining the problem of single link-level anomaly
localization, have shown that resources that enable the moni-
toring of a set of paths distinguishing between all links of the
network pairwise must be deployed for unambiguous anomaly
localization. In this paper, we show that the number of pair
of links that are to be distinguished can be cut down drasti-
cally using an already established anomaly detection solution.
This results in reducing the localization overhead and cost
significantly. Furthermore, we show that all potential anomaly
scenarios can be derived offline from the anomaly detection
solution. Therefore, we compute full localization solutions, i.e.
monitors that are to be activated and paths that are to be
monitored, for all potential anomaly scenarios offline. This results
in a significant minimization of localization delay. We devise an
anomaly localization technique that selects monitor locations and
monitoring paths jointly; thereby enabling a trade-off between
the number and locations of monitoring devices and the quality
of monitoring paths. The problem is formulated as an integer
linear program (ILP), and is shown to be NP-hard through a
polynomial-time reduction from the NP-hard facility location
problem. The effectiveness and the correctness of the proposed
anomaly localization scheme are verified through theoretical
analysis and extensive simulations.
Index Terms—Network monitoring, anomaly localization,
anomaly detection, link-level anomalies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly localization aims at identifying unambiguously
the link that causes an anomalous behavior of the network
(e.g. excessive delay, high packet loss rate, etc.). It has long
been combined with anomaly detection (e.g. [1]-[5]). How-
ever, several research works argued that continuous anomaly
localization can result in high overhead on the underlying
network, and therefore, can interfere with the network ser-
vices leading to service troubles. Recent works on network
monitoring consider anomaly localization as a reaction to
anomaly detection and perform two-phase monitoring (e.g. [6]-
[12]). The first phase, the anomaly detection phase, uses as
few network resources as possible to only detect anomalies.
A necessary and sufficient condition to detect all link-level
anomalies is to cover all the network links. Upon detecting
an anomaly, the detection phase returns a set of suspect links.
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Here comes the localization phase that aims at reducing the
set of suspect links to the anomalous link(s). Clearly, this
reactive anomaly localization approach reduces significantly
the monitoring overhead compared to continuous anomaly
localization. However it presents a serious challenge: the
localization must be as fast as possible, in order to enable
a fast recovery of the network.
Argawal et al. [7] proposed an accurate link-level anomaly
localization scheme that can localize all potential single link-
level anomalies in a given network. The key idea is to
deploy resources that enable the monitoring of a set of paths
distinguishing all links of the network pairwise. Whenever an
anomaly is detected, this set of paths is monitored in order
to pinpoint the anomalous link. More recently, Barford et
al. [8] proposed another scheme that selects paths that are
to be monitored during the localization phase. Although this
technique minimizes the localization overhead, because the
monitored paths distinguish only between the suspect link, it
suffers from two imperfections. The first is the non-negligible
time of computing the set of paths that are to be monitored
upon detecting an anomaly, which increases the localization
delay (i.e. time elapsed between the moment when an anomaly
is detected and the moment when the anomalous link is
pinpointed). The second is that there is no guarantee to localize
all potential anomalies, because deployed monitors ensure only
the coverage of links. In this paper, we demonstrate that 1) not
all links of the network need to be distinguishable pairwise
towards localizing all potential anomalies, 2) all potential
anomaly scenarios can be derived offline from any detection
solution that covers all the network links. Thus, we compute
full low-cost localization solutions, i.e. monitors that are to be
activated and paths that are to be monitored, for all potential
anomalies offline. Subsequently, we achieve an important gain
in localization delay and overhead.
Furthermore, most existing works consider only one crite-
rion for monitoring path selection that is the minimization
of the number of monitored paths, and only one criterion
for monitor location selection that is the minimization of
the number of deployed monitoring devices. However, these
criteria do not reflect the localization cost properly. Indeed,
to reduce localization delay and overhead, monitoring of
links that do not provide extra localization information during
the localization phase must be avoided. Moreover, monitor
locations must be selected carefully towards minimizing the
delay of communications between the Network Operation
Center (NOC) and the deployed monitors. A novel anomaly
localization cost model that considers the infrastructure cost,
the localization overhead and the localization delays is, there-
fore, proposed in this paper. Besides, our anomaly localization
scheme selects monitor locations and monitoring paths jointly,
thereby enabling a trade-off between the number and locations
of deployed monitoring devices and the quality of selected
monitoring paths. We formulate our scheme as an ILP, and
we show that the problem is NP-hard through a polynomial-
time reduction from the facility location problem.
We verify the effectiveness of our anomaly localization
scheme by comparing it with existing anomaly localization
schemes through extensive simulations
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We model the network as a undirected graph G = (N ; E)
comprising a set of nodes N connected by a set of undirected
links in E . Let P be the set of all non-looping paths of
the network. Unless otherwise mentioned, without loss of
generality, we assume that all the network paths are candidate
to be monitored and all the network nodes are candidate to
hold monitoring devices. We use the term monitoring paths to
designate paths that are monitored during the detection phase,
also referred to as detection paths, or during the localization
phase, also referred to as localization paths. We denote the
anomaly detection solution by (Dm;Dp). Dm is the set of
monitor locations where to deploy monitoring devices. Dp is a
set of monitoring paths traveling between the selected monitor
locations and covering all the network links, [p2Dpp = E .
We assume that an anomaly on link e 2 E affects all the
monitoring paths that cross e. Two links are said to be
distinguishable from each other if we are able to decide which
one is anomalous when an anomaly occurs on one of them.
We address the problem of single-link level anomaly lo-
calization. The objective is to enable the localization of all
potential link-level anomalies accurately; while minimizing
the cost of acquiring and deploying monitoring devices, the
localization overhead and the localization delay. Our localiza-
tion scheme infers all potential anomaly scenarios from any
detection solution that covers all links of the network. This
has two major benefits. The first is that we pre-compute full
localization solutions for all anomaly scenarios offline, thereby
accelerating the localization process. The second is that we
do not need to deploy resources that can distinguish every
single pair of the network links. This is because, as it will be
demonstrated in the next sections, only links that belong to the
same anomaly scenario need to be distinguishable pairwise.
The inputs into our localization problem are an instance of
the graph G = (N ; E) and a set of detection paths Dp
that can cover all links in E , and the outputs are a set of
monitor locations whose monitors are to be activated and
a set of paths that are to be monitored for each potential
anomaly. The localization solution must achieve a good trade-
off between the monitor deployment cost, the localization
overhead and the localization delay. To this end, a novel cost
model that measures these three metrics is proposed. Also, our
localization scheme selects monitor locations and localization
paths jointly; as opposed to existing schemes that apply a
two-step selection procedure, therefore omitting the trade-off
between the number and locations of monitors and the quality
of localization paths.
III. NOT ALL LINK PAIRS NEED TO BE DISTINGUISHABLE
FOR LOCALIZING ALL SINGLE LINK-LEVEL ANOMALIES
In this section, we first establish a necessary and sufficient
condition to distinguish between two links; and then, we prove
that we do not need to distinguish between all links of the
network pairwise in order to ensure accurate localization of
all potential single link-level anomalies. This excludes a pre-
established condition claiming that all links of the network
need to be distinguishable pairwise in order to localize all
potential single links level anomalies [7][8].
Theorem 1: The necessary and sufficient condition for two
links e1 and e2 to be distinguishable from each other is the
existence of a monitoring path that crosses either e1 or e2,
but not both.
Proof: We first demonstrate the sufficiency condition.
Assume that either e1 or e2 is anomalous. Let p be a path
that crosses e1 (interchangeably e2) but not e2. If p exhibits
an anomaly, then the anomalous link must be crossed by p.
We conclude that e1 is the anomalous link. If, p does not
exhibit an anomaly, then all links that are crossed by p are
not anomalous. It follows that the anomalous link is e2. Thus,
p is sufficient to distinguish between e1 and e2.
The necessary condition can be proved as follows. Assume
that it does not exist any path that crosses only one of the two
links. Then, the monitoring path set can be divided into two
types of paths: paths that cross both e1 and e2, and paths that
neither cross e1 nor e2. An anomaly on a given link affects all
the monitoring paths that cross that link. Therefore, the latter
type of paths is not affected by the anomalies on the two links,
whereas the former type of paths is affected by the anomalies
on the two links. Thus, the set of monitoring paths that are
affected by an anomaly on e1 is exactly the same set of paths
that is affected by an anomaly on e2. This means that e1 and
e2 cannot be distinguished from each other.
Existing localization schemes (e.g. [7], [8]) claim that all
links of the network must be distinguished pairwise in order
to localize all potential anomalies. According to Theorem
1, this means that 8e1; e2 2 E there exists a monitoring
path that crosses either e2 or e2, but not both. However, we
will demonstrate that this is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for localizing all potential anomalies, and we show
how to infer the minimal set of pair of links that are to be
distinguished from a given detection solution that covers all
the network links.
Consider a network link e 2 E . We denote by De+ and De 
the set of detection paths that cross e and the set of detection
paths that do not cross e, respectively. The set of suspect links
for an anomaly e is the set of potential anomalous links that is
returned by the detection process when an anomaly occurs on
link e, i.e. all links that the detection paths cannot distinguish
from e.
Theorem 2: The set of suspect links for an anomaly on a
given link e 2 E equals \p2De+p  [p2De p.
Proof: We prove this theorem by construction. The set of
detection paths can be divided into two sets:
 De+ : paths that cross link e.
 De  : paths that do not cross link e.
An anomaly on link e affects only paths that cross this
link. Subsequently, paths in De  do not exhibit an anomaly.
It follows that all the links that are crossed by paths in De 
are not suspect. Now, let L be the set of links that are crossed
by paths in De+ and that are not crossed by paths in De  , L
= [p2De+p - [p2De  p . L can be divided into two subsets of
links:
 L1: links =2 \p2De+p  [p2De p
 L2: links 2 \p2De+p  [p2De p
We prove by contradiction that all links in L1 are not
suspect. Assume to the contrary that a link l 2 L1 is
suspect. This means that there does not exist any path in De+
that distinguishes between l and e. It follows that for each
p 2 De+ , p crosses e and l. Thus l 2 \p2De+p   [p2De  p,
leading to a contradiction.
Likewise, we prove by contradiction that all links in L2
are suspect. Assume to the contrary that a link l 2 L2 is
not suspect, then, there exists at least one path p 2 De+
such that p distinguishes between e and l. Since all paths
in De+ cross e, then p does not cross l. It follows that
l =2 \p2De+p  [p2De p, leading to a contradiction.
Corollary 1: A sufficient and necessary condition
to localize all potential link-level anomalies is to
distinguish each link e 2 E from links that belong to
\p2De+p  f[p2De p [ fegg.
We refer to the set of suspect links for an anomaly on link
e as S(e).
Corollary 2: e1 2 S(e2) , S(e1) = S(e2), 8e1; e2 2 E
Corollary 3: S(e1) 6= S(e2) , S(e1) \ S(e2) = ;
Let dS be the set of distinct sets of suspect links.
Corollary 4: [e2ES(e) = [S(i)2dSS(i) = E
Corollary 5:
P
S(i)2dS j S(i) j = j E j
Let AllPairs denotes the number of all the network link
pairs. Clearly, AllPairs = (j E j (j E j  1))=2. Let dPairs
denotes the number of pair of links that need be distinguishable
in order to localize all potential link-level anomalies.
Corollary 6: dPairs = AllPairs -
X
S(i);S(j)2dS:i<j
j S(i) j  j S(j) j
The properties presented in the above corollaries are demon-
strated in Appendix A. Corollary 6 confirms that we do not
need to distinguish between all the network link pairs; unless
the number of detection paths equals 1, which is very unlikely.
It will demonstrated later in this paper that this reduction in
the number of links pairs that are to be distinguished achieves
great savings in resources needed to localize anomalies.
IV. DERIVATION OF POTENTIAL ANOMALY SCENARIOS
Theorem 2 states that the set of suspect links returned
at the end of the detection phase whenever an anomaly on
link e occurs is \p2De+p   [p2De p. Therefore, instead of
computing monitors that are to be activated and paths that
are to be monitored during the localization phase whenever
an anomaly is detected, we propose to perform these compu-
tations for all potential anomalies only once offline. Having
a set of detection paths that cover all links of the network,
we infer the set of suspect links for each link as described
in Theorem 2. Then, a single anomaly scenario is created
for all links that have the same set of suspect links, i.e. an
anomaly scenario is created for each distinct set of suspect
links. Let us denote by A the set of all anomaly scenarios,
and let Sa denotes the set of suspect links associated to the
anomaly scenario a 2 A. dS = fSa;8a 2 Ag. Clearly, the
least upper bound of the number of anomaly scenarios is the
number of the network links. It is easy to show that when this
bound is reached, the set of suspect links for an anomaly on
link e, 8e 2 E , is reduced to the link e. In such case, the
localization of all potential anomalies is immediate from the
detection information. According to Corollary 2, we need to
deploy monitors that enable the monitoring of a set of paths
distinguishing links of each anomaly scenario pairwise in order
to ensure the localization of all potential anomalies.
To illustrate, consider the sample network topology depicted
in Fig. 1. An associated anomaly detection solution that covers
all links of the network is depicted at the bottom of the figure.
We use Theorem 2 to compute the set of suspect links for each
link of the network. The result is depicted in Table I. The sets
of suspect links associated to link (2; 3) and link (0; 7) are
unitary. In case an anomaly occurs on one of these two links,
there is no need to trigger the localization phase because the
anomalous link is immediately pinpointed by intersecting the
detection paths that exhibit the anomaly. Furthermore, four
non-unitary anomaly scenarios (a1, a2, a3, a4) are created for
this topology (see table II). These are the four distinct non-
unitary sets of suspect links. It should be noted that for this
sample topology only 24 link pairs (
P
1i4(j ai j (j ai j
 1))=2) among the 153 link pairs of the network ( 18  (18 
1)=2) need to be distinguishable.
V. ANOMALY LOCALIZATION COST
Consider a set of candidate monitor locations, M, a set of
network paths that are candidate to be monitored, P 0 , and a
set of anomaly scenarios A. The anomaly localization cost
includes two costs:
Fig. 1: Illustrative network and an associated anomaly detection solution
TABLE I: Sets of suspect links for all potential anomalies
Anomalous link Set of suspect links
(0; 1) f(0, 1)g
(0; 2) f(0, 2), (1, 3), (1, 7)g
(1; 2) f(0, 6), (5, 6), (4, 5), (2, 4), (1, 2)g
(0; 3) f(1, 5), (0, 5), (0, 3), (2, 6), (6, 7)g
(1; 3) f(0, 2), (1, 3), (1, 7)g
(2; 3) f(2, 3)g
(0; 4) f(0, 4), (1, 4)g
(1; 4) f(0, 4), (1, 4)g
(2; 4) f(0, 6), (5, 6), (4, 5), (2, 4), (1, 2)g
(0; 5) f(1, 5), (0, 5), (0, 3), (2, 6), (6, 7)g
(1; 5) f(1, 5), (0, 5), (0, 3), (2, 6), (6, 7)g
(4; 5) f(0, 6), (5, 6), (4, 5), (2, 4), (1, 2)g
(0; 6) f(0, 6), (5, 6), (4, 5), (2, 4), (1, 2)g
(2; 6) f(1, 5), (0, 5), (0, 3), (2, 6), (6, 7)g
(5; 6) f(0, 6), (5, 6), (4, 5), (2, 4), (1, 2)g
(0; 7) f(0, 7)g
(1; 7) f(0, 2), (1, 3), (1, 7)g
(6; 7) f(1, 5), (0, 5), (0, 3), (2, 6), (6, 7)g
TABLE II: Anomaly scenarios
Anomaly scenario Set of suspect links
a1 Sa1 = f(0, 2), (1, 3), (1, 7)g
a2 Sa2 = f(0, 6), (5, 6), (4, 5), (2, 4), (1, 2)g
a3 Sa3 = f(1, 5), (0, 5), (0, 3), (2, 6), (6, 7)g
a4 Sa1 = f(0, 4), (1, 4)g
 Monitor cost: it includes the effective cost of acquiring
hardware and software monitoring devices and the cost
of their maintenance. In addition, it includes the cost
of communications between monitors and the NOC. For
instance, the cost of communications between a monitor
and the NOC can be expressed as a function of the
physical distance that separates them. Let us denote by
Cn the cost of deploying a monitor on node n. Let Yn be a
binary variable that indicates whether node n is selected
to hold a monitoring device. The monitor cost can be
expressed as follows: X
n2M
CnYn (1)
 Probe cost: it expresses the overhead of monitoring flows
on the underlying network. Measurements of links that do
not provide localization information should be avoided
in order to minimize the monitoring overhead. Clearly,
measuring links that do not belong to the set of suspect
links of an anomaly scenario does not provide any extra
localization information. Furthermore, measurement of
links that belong to the set of suspect links might be
useless. Revisit Fig. 1 and table I to illustrate. Consider an
anomaly on link (6; 7). The associated set of suspect links
is Sa3 = f(1; 5); (0; 5); (0; 3); (2; 6); (6; 7)g. Consider now
the set of paths fp1:(1; 5)(5; 6)(2; 6); p2:(1; 5)(0; 5)(0; 2);
p3:(1; 7)(6; 7)(2; 6)g that distinguishes between all the
suspect links pairwise. Path p1 divides S into two subsets:
S1a3f(1; 5); (2; 6)g and S2a3f(0; 5); (0; 3); (6; 7)g. The links
of S1a3 are distinguished from links of S2a3 . Link (5; 6) that
is crossed by p1 does not belong to Sa3 , and therefore,
it does not provide any localization information. Path p2
divides S1a3 into two subsets: S11a3f(1; 5)g and S12f(2; 6)g,
and divides S2a3 into two subsets: S21a3f(0; 5); (6; 7)g and
S22a3f(0; 3)g. Finally, p3 distinguishes betwen (0; 5) and
(6; 7). However, it crosses (2; 6) that is already distin-
guished from all the other suspect links. Thus, measuring
(2; 6) by p3 does not provide extra localization informa-
tion, although it belongs to S.
Let us denote by Ce the cost of measuring link e. Ce
should be proportional to the load of link e, in order
to avoid multiple measurements of the most overloaded
links of the network. Consider an anomaly scenario a 2
A. Let us denote by Sa the set of suspect links associated
to the anomaly scenario a. Let Xpa be a binary variable
that specifies whether path p is part of the localization
solution of a. Let pe be a binary input parameter that
indicates whether path p crosses link e. The probe cost
of the localization solution of a reads as follows:X
e2E;p2P0
CepeXpa (2)
VI. ILP FORMULATION
The objective of the ILP is to find a localization solution for
each anomaly scenario in A such that the anomaly localization
cost is minimized. Let pn be a binary parameter that indicates
whether node n is an end-node of path p. For simplicity of
notation, we define the following sets:
 P0 = fpe; p 2 P
0
; e 2 Eg
 M = fpn; p 2 P 0 ; n 2Mg
 CM = fCn; n 2Mg
 CE = fCe; e 2 Eg
Let  be the weight associated to the monitor cost,
and let  be the weight associated to the probe cost.
The input into the ILP is an instance of the graph G =
(E ;M;P 0 ;A; P0 ; M; CM; CE ; ; ). The objective function
minimizes the sum of the monitor cost and the probe cost. It
reads as follows:
 
X
n2M
CnYn +  
X
a2A;e2E;p2P0
CepeXpa (3)
The ILP is subject to two constraints. The first constraint
ensures that the end nodes of all selected monitoring paths
hold monitoring devices. It reads as follows:
Yn  pnXpa; 8n 2M;8p 2 P 0 ;8a 2 A (4)
The second constraint ensures that the suspect links asso-
ciated to each anomaly scenario are distinguishable pairwise.
To this end, according to Theorem 2, the constraint ensures
that for each anomaly scenario a and for each pair of suspect
links (e1; e2) : e1; e2 2 Sa there exists at least one monitoring
path that crosses either e2 or e2, but not both. This constraint
reads as follows:X
p2P0
(pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2)Xpa > 0;
8a 2 A;8e1; e2 2 Sa (5)
We show that the above inequality is sufficient to distinguish
between all the link pairs of each anomaly scenario using the
argument of the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Let P1 be the subset of paths of P 0 that
cross either e1 or e2, but not both.
P
p2P0 (pe1 + pe2  
2pe1pe2) =j P1 j.
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
Corollary 7: If
P
p2P0 (pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2)Xpa > 0,
then there exists at least one path in P 0 that crosses either
e1 or e2, i.e. there exists at least one path in P 0 that
distinguishes between e1 and e2.
VII. OUR ANOMALY LOCALIZATION PROBLEM IS
NP -HARD
Theorem 4: The anomaly localization problem presented in
the previous section is NP-Hard.
Proof: Our anomaly localization problem can be reduced
from the NP-Hard facility location problem.
Facility location problem: consider a set of potential
facility locations F , and a set of clients D. Opening a facility
at location i incurs a non-negative cost that is equal to fi. The
cost of servicing client j 2 D by a facility installed at location
i 2 F is dij . The problem is to find an assignment of each
client to exactly one facility such that the sum of the facility
opening costs and the service costs is minimized.
We denote by f the set of facility opening costs, f =
ffi; i 2 Fg, and by d the set of service costs, d =
fdij ; i 2 F ; j 2 Dg. Given an instance I = (D;F ; f; d)
of the facility location problem, we produce an instance
R(I) = (E ;M;P 0 ;A; P0 ; N ; CM; CE ; ; ) of our local-
ization problem as follows. For each client j 2 D, we create:
 Three nodes labeled by nj1, nj2, and nj3.
 One link connecting nj1 to nj2, labeled by ej1.
 One link connecting nj2 to nj3, labeled by ej2.
 An anomaly scenario aj such that Saj = fej1, ej2g.
For each facility location i 2 F , we create two nodes
labeled by mi1 and mi2. For each i 2 F and for each
j 2 D, we create one link connecting mi1 to nj1, labeled
by e1ij , and one link connecting mi2 to nj2, labeled by e
2
ij .
We obtain a graph G = (E ;N ), where N = fnik; i 2 D; k 2
[1; 3]g [ fmjk; i 2 F ; k 2 [1; 2]g, and E = fejk; j 2 D; k 2
[1; 3]g[fekij ; i 2 F ; j 2 D; k 2 [1; 2]g. An example of a graph
constructed out of a facility location instance with four facility
locations and four clients is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Example of a graph constructed out of a facility location instance
with four facility locations and four clients
The candidate monitor location set is M = fmjk; i 2
F ; k 2 [1; 2]g. The anomaly scenario set is A = faj ; j 2 Dg.
The set of candidate monitoring paths is P 0 = fpij ; i 2 F ; j 2
Dg, where pij is the non-looping path between mi1 and mi2
that crosses the links e1ij , ej1 and e
2
ij . The monitor deployment
costs are defined as follows: Cmi1 = Cmi2 = fi=2. The link
measurement costs are defined as follows: Cei1 = Cei2 = 0,
Ce1ij = Ce2ij = dij=2. The remaining input parameters can be
inferred easily from G, M, A and P 0 as follows:
 ajej0k =

1 if j = j
0
0 otherwise
; 8j; j0 2 D; k 2 [1; 2]
 ajekij = 0; 8i 2 F ; j 2 D; k 2 [1; 2]
 pijmi0k =

1 if i = i
0
0 otherwise
; 8i; i0 2 F ; k 2 [1; 2]
 pijej1 = pije1ij = pije2ij = 1; 8i 2 F ; j 2 D
 pijej2 = 0; 8i 2 F ; j 2 D
  =  = 1
Obviously, the above reduction can be carried out in
polynomial-time. In the sequel, we show that there is an
optimal solution to the Instance I of the facility location
problem if and only of there is an optimal solution to the
instance R(I) of our anomaly localization problem.
Let us start by demonstrating that if there is an optimal
solution to the facility location instance, then there is a feasible
solution to the anomaly localization instance. Let the facility
location solution assigns each client j to a facility installed
at location i. Consider the anomaly localization solution that
selects for each anomaly scenario aj the path pij and the
monitor locations mi1 and mi2. Fix an anomaly scenario aj .
By construction, path pij crosses three links that are ej1 and
e1ij and e
2
ij . It follows, according to Theorem 1, that pij
distinguishes between ej1 and ej2. Constraint (4) states that
if pij is selected to be monitored, then, its end nodes must
be selected to hold monitoring devices. Thus, the solution
that selects for each anomaly scenario aj the path pij to
be monitored, and its end nodes, mi1 and mi2, as monitor
locations is a feasible solution to the anomaly localization
instance.
Conversely, we demonstrate that if there is an optimal
solution to the anomaly localization instance, then there is a
feasible solution to the facility location instance. An optimal
solution to the facility location problem selects exactly one
path for each anomaly scenario. This is because each anomaly
scenario comprises only two links, and thus, monitoring one
path that crosses exactly one of the two links is sufficient to
distinguish between them. Let the optimal anomaly localiza-
tion solution selects for each anomaly scenario aj the path pij ,
and naturally, the monitor locations mi1 and mi2. Trivially,
the solution that assigns to each client j 2 D the facility
installed at location i is a feasible solution to the facility
location instance.
We now prove that the constructed anomaly localization
solution has the same cost as its corresponding optimal facility
location solution (the proof holds in the converse case). LetWi
and Zij be a binary variable that indicates whether a facility
is installed at location i, and a binary variable that indicates
whether client j is serviced by a facility installed at location
i, respectively. Using the arguments that Zij = Xpijaj and
Wi = Yi1 = Yi2, we show that the cost of the localization
solution, denoted by Cost(SR(I)), is equal to the cost of its
corresponding facility location solution, denoted by Cost(SI),
as follows:
Cost(SR(I)) =
X
mik2M
CmikYmik +
X
aj2A;pij2P0
(Ce1ij
+
Ce2ij
)Xpijaj
=
X
mi12M
fiYmi1 +
X
aj2A;pij2P0
dijXpijaj
=
X
i2F
fiWi +
X
j2D;i2F
dijZij
= Cost(SI)
Now, we show that the solution to the anomaly localization
instance, denoted by SR(I), that is constructed out of an
optimal solution to the facility location instance, denoted by
SI , is optimal. Assume to the contrary that SR(I) is not
optimal. Let S
0
R(I) be an optimal solution to the anomaly lo-
calization instance, and let S
0
I be the facility location solution
constructed out of S
0
R(I). We have Cost(S

I ) = Cost(SR(I)) <
Cost(S
0
R(I)) = Cost(S
0
I), leading to a contradiction. Using the
same arguments, we can show that the solution to the facility
location instance constructed out of an optimal solution to the
anomaly localization instance is optimal.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Methodology
We compare our anomaly localization scheme with an
hybrid anomaly localization scheme that combines the
strengths of the schemes proposed in [7] and [8]. As proposed
in [8], a set of paths that distinguishes only between the
pairs of suspect links is monitored during the localization
phase. However, to guarantee that all potential anomalies can
be localized uniquely, a set of monitors that can distinguish
between all pairs of the network links is deployed [7]. Such
a scheme can be formulated as two ILPs. The first ILP
computes a minimal subset of monitor locations that enables
the localization of all potential anomalies. This ILP is run
only once offline. It reads as follows:
Minimize
X
n2M
Yn
subject to:X
p2P
(pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2)Zp > 0;
8e1; e2 2 E ;8p 2 P
pnYn  Zp; 8p 2 P;8n 2 N
The second ILP is run whenever an anomaly is detected. The
input is the set of monitor locations selected by the first ILP,
M0 , and a set of suspect links S. The output is a minimal set
of monitoring paths that can distinguish between the suspect
links pairwise. This ILP reads as follows:
Minimize
X
p2P
Zp
subject to:X
p2P
(pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2)Zp > 0;
8e1; e2 2 S;8p 2 P
Zp  pnYn; 8p 2 P;8n 2M0
We refer to this hybrid anomaly localization scheme as
HLS. We solve the ILPs using Cplex11.2 [15] running on
a PC equipped with a 2,992.47 MHz Intel(R) Core(TM)2
Duo processor and 3.9 GB of RAM. We consider only small
topologies (8 nodes and 18 links) for which the ILPs can
deliver solutions in tractable time. All numerical results are
the mean over 30 simulations on random topologies. We use
Brite (Waxman model:  =  = 0:4, random node placement)
to generate network topologies [14]. Our localization scheme
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Fig. 3: Numerical results for TOP(8, 18). In each of the two sub-graphs, the first histogram to the left presents results for solutions computed
using the hybrid localization scheme (HLS), and the other histograms present results for the solutions computed using our anomaly localization
ILP with different values of .
takes as input any detection solution that covers all links
of the network. Detection solutions are computed using the
anomaly detection scheme proposed in [11]. For our anomaly
localization ILP, we set Cn = Ce = 1;8n 2 N and 8e 2 E.
We set the weight associated to the probe cost  = 1, and we
vary the weight associated to the monitor cost  2 [1; 2; 4; 6[.
B. Simulation Results
We define three metrics for the comparison. The first
metric is the time of computing the localization solution, i.e.
monitors that are to be activated and paths that are to be
monitored when an anomaly is detected. This metric reflects
the speed of the localization scheme. The better is to avoid
online computations, i.e. computations done upon detecting
an anomaly, in order to shorten the localization delay.
TABLE III: Average ILP Computation Time (seconds) for
TOP(8, 18)
Hybrid scheme Our scheme
Offline Computation Time 64.16 6.67
Online Computation Time 25:7 10 3 0
Table III depicts the online computation time and the offline
computation time for the hybrid localization scheme and for
our localization scheme. Intuitively, as shown in the table, the
online computation time is zero for our localization scheme.
This is because we compute full localization solutions for all
potential anomalies offline. In contradiction, the hybrid scheme
leaves the selection of monitoring paths upon detecting an
anomaly, thereby achieving a non-negligible online computa-
tion time. This time can be relatively high for large topologies
where the number of candidate monitoring paths is large. For
the offline computation time, the table shows that our scheme
is about 10 times faster than the hybrid scheme, although, it
computes full localization solutions for all potential anomalies.
We explain this result by the fact that, unlike the hybrid
scheme, our scheme does not distinguish between every pair
of the network links.
The second metric is the localization cost. Fig. 3a plots the
total number of deployed monitors, the average number of
active monitors per anomaly, and the average overhead, i.e.
the number of links monitored that provide no localization
information, per anomaly for the hybrid localization scheme
and for our localization scheme with  2 [1; 2; 4; 6[. Three
conclusions can be drawn from the numerical results. The first
is that there is an interplay between the monitor location cost
and the probe cost. The different results for the different values
of  illustrate this conclusion. Indeed, the larger the value of
 is, the fewer the number of monitors is and the larger the
localization overhead is. For instance, for  = 1, we have
localization solutions with zero overhead and 7 monitors, i.e.
7 of the 8 nodes of the network hold monitoring devices. The
second is that the existing localization scheme that deploys
monitors offline and selects monitoring paths online does not
take into consideration this interplay, and therefore, delivers
sub-optimal localization solutions. In effect, using the same
number of monitors, for   6, our localization scheme can
localize any potential anomaly with about 65% less overhead
than the existing localization scheme.
The third metric is the number of monitoring paths. Recall that
this is the path selection criterion for the existing localization
scheme. We do not consider this criterion in our localization
scheme for two reasons. The first is that, upon detecting
an anomaly, the set of paths that distinguish between the
suspect links are monitored simultaneously. Therefore, the
minimization of the number of monitoring paths does not
reduce the localization delay. The second reason is that this
metric is tightly correlated to the number of monitors and the
localization overhead. Indeed, if we relax the constraint on
the localization overhead, this would allow long monitoring
paths that cross a large number of links. Therefore, the number
of monitoring paths that can distinguish between the suspect
links would decrease. Likewise, if we relax the constraint on
the number of monitors, we would deploy more monitors in
the network, thus, the monitoring paths would get shorter.
Therefore, the number of monitoring paths that can distinguish
between the suspect links would increase. Fig. 3b validates
these claims. Hereby, we can observe that the larger  is,
the more monitoring paths we have. Not surprisingly, for
  6, our localization scheme monitors only 18% more paths
than the hybrid localization scheme, while deploying the same
number of monitors and incurring 65% less overhead.
IX. ROBUSTNESS OF OUR ANOMALY LOCALIZATION
SCHEME AGAINST TOPOLOGY CHANGES
The anomaly localization solution must be updated when-
ever the detection solution changes. However, the detection
solution changes in rare cases where a persistent anomaly
makes a network link unavailable for a long period of time,
or where the network topology is modified voluntary (e.g. add
and/or removal of links and/or nodes). Clearly, in the first case,
only the anomaly scenario whose set of suspect links contains
the anomalous link is affected by the anomaly. After updating
the set of detection paths, the affected anomaly scenario is
updated and its localization solution is recomputed. Further,
voluntary network changes are usually planned in advance,
in which case detection and localization updates should be
computed offline before changes are made. We conclude based
on this discussion that it is of great importance to provide
a fast heuristic for computing localization solutions in order
to ensure fast recovery of the localization process in case of
persistent anomalies.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the problem of localizing
single link-level anomalies. Two findings were presented and
demonstrated: 1) Not all pairs of the the network links need
to be distinguishable for localizing all potential link-level
anomalies, 2) All potential anomaly scenarios can be derived
offline from any detection solution that covers all the network
links. These findings were exploited to develop an anomaly
localization scheme that computes full localization solutions
offline. In order to achieve a good trade-off between the
number and locations of monitoring devices and the quality
of monitoring paths, monitor locations and monitoring paths
are selected jointly. A novel anomaly localization cost model
was proposed, and our localization scheme was formulated
as an ILP. However, it was demonstrated that the problem
is NP-hard. Our scheme was compared with an hybrid
anomaly localization scheme that combines the strengths of
two existing schemes. Extensive simulations was conducted
on small network topologies. Results show that using the
same number of monitoring devices, our schemes incurs 65%
less overhead than the hybrid scheme. Our ongoing work is
on the design of a scalable, cost-efficient and fast heuristic
solution. Furthermore, we are working on extending our
scheme to localize multiple link-level anomalies.
APPENDIX A
This section presents the proofs of corollaries 2, 3, 4, 5 and
6.
 Corollary 2: e1 2 S(e2) , S(e1) = S(e2), 8e1; e2 2 E
Proof: e1 2 S(e2), (according to Theorem 1) there
does not exist any path that crosses either e1 or e2, but
not both, for each p 2 P , p crosses both e2 and e1, or p
neither crosses e1 nor e2 , De1+ = De2+ and De1  =
De2  , (according to Theorem 2) S(e1) = S(e2)
 Corollary 4: S(e1) 6= S(e2) , S(e1) \ S(e2) = ;
Proof: We prove the direct implication by contra-
diction. Assume to the contrary that S(e1) 6= S(e2) and
S(e1) \ S(e2) 6= ;. Let e3 2 S(e1) \ S(e2). According
Corollary 2, S(e3) = S(e1) and S(e3) = S(e2). thus,
S(e1) = S(e2), leading to a contradiction. The indirect
implication is trivially true.
 Corollary 3: [e2ES(e) = [S(i)2dSS(i) = E
Proof: According to Theorem 2, e 2 S(e);8e 2
E . Thus, [e2ES(e) = E . Obviously, [e2ES(e) =
[S(i)2dSS(i).
 Corollary 5:
X
S(i)2dS
j S(i) j = j E j
Proof: According to Corollary 4, j [S(i)2dSS(i) j=j
E j, and according to Corollary 2, \S(i)2dSS(i) = ;.
Thus,
X
S(i)2dS
j S(i) j = j E j.
 Corollary 6: dPairs = AllPairs -
X
S(i);S(j)2dS:i<j
j S(i) j  j S(j) j
Proof: According to Corollary 1, only links that
belong to same set of suspect links need to be distinguish-
able pairwise. Therefore, the set of link pairs that are to be
distinguished can be expressed as ff(ei; ej); ei; ej 2 Eg
- f(ei; ej); S(ei) 6= S(ej)gg. We conclude that dPairs =
AllPairs -
X
S(i);S(j)2dS:i<j
j S(i) j  j S(j) j . Clearly, the
number of pair of links that need to be distinguishable
equals the number of all link pairs of the network if and
only if the number of distinct sets of suspect links equals
1, i.e. the number of detection paths equals 1.
APPENDIX B
This section presents the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof: Paths in P 0 can be divided into three subsets of
paths.
 P1: paths that cross either e1 or e2, but not both.
 P2: paths that cross both e1 and e2.
 P3: paths that neither cross e1 nor e2.
On the one hand, we have
8p 2 P2, pe1 = 0 and pe2 = 0.
Thus, 8p 2 P2; (pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2) = 0.
Contributing to
P
p2P2(pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2) > 0.
On the other hand, we have 8p 2 P3, pe1 = 1 and pe2 = 1.
Thus, 8p 2 P3, (pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2) = 0.
Contributing to
P
p2P3(pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2) = 0.
Subsequently,
P
p2P0 (pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2) =P
p2P1(pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2).
Now, we have 8p 2 P1 pe1 + pe2 = 1 and pe1pe2 = 0.
Thus, pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2 = 1:
Therefore,
P
p2P1(pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2) = Cardinal(P1).
We conclude that
P
p2P0 (pe1 + pe2   2pe1pe2) =
Cardinal(P1).
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